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Changing Identities and Changing Law:
Possibilities for a Global Legal Culture
RUSSELL MENYHART °
INTRODUCTION
The 2002 World Cup provided a symbolic moment in the evolving relation-
ship of identity and the nation-state. The source was the Polish squad, one of the
teams hoping to create a stir in that summer of fine football. Still emerging from
decades of Soviet control, the Polish people were full of pride for their team, es-
pecially for their star forward Emmanuel Olisadebe. Olisadebe, a 24-year-old
born in Nigeria, was discovered in Lagos by a Polish scout and began playing for
a cellar-dwelling Warsaw club team in 1997. In just three years he led the club to
an unprecedented joint League and Cup championship, and Zbigniew Boniek,
a former Polish star, led a campaign for Olisadebe to be granted citizenship.
With the assistance of a presidential decree, Olisadebe, still barely able to speak
Polish, became a Polish citizen just before the deadline for World Cup qualify-
ing matches. He scored seven goals, led Poland to the final round of play in
South Korea and Japan, and was quickly proclaimed a new Polish hero.'
With a nudge and a wink, a Nigerian became one of the most recognizable
Poles. The populace of one of Europe's most homogeneous nations suddenly
embraced an African-Pole. Its response revealed that, even in a society still dis-
covering its own post-Cold War independence and identity, citizenship and na-
tion may be just terms of convenience. They mean little more than a team to
cheer for; even if some Polish children cheered for England or Germany in the
World Cup, no one reprimanded them. The era during which the nation-state
not only claimed to be unchallengeable but also was assumed to be sacrosanct has
*J.D., 2003, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington; B.A., East Asian Studies, 1998,
Oberlin College. I wish to thank all those who have encouraged my curiosity in global issues, first
and foremost my family.
1. See Exclusive Interview: Emmanuel Olisadebe, AFRICAN SOCCER MAGAZINE, Nov. 2000, http'/
www.sportscheduler.co.sz/afcocmag/afsocmag.-nov00_interviewolisadebe.htm (last visited Oct.
16, 2002) [hereinafter Olisadebe Interview]); Interview with Emmanuel Olisadebe, FOOTBALL
CULTURE.NET, at http'/www.footballculture.net/players/intemm.html (last visited Jan. 29, 2003).
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come to an end. The nation-as a source of identity-may be reduced to the
status of a sports uniform.2
The theory of globalization this Note builds upon is the model of denation-
alization.' In this model, globalization is a radical rearrangement of communi-
ties that results in a need to relocate our sources of laws and legal norms. Most
denationalization analysis focuses on the interplay between communities and
societies on the regional or global scale and questions the possibility of denation-
alization. This Note takes a different tack, accepting for the sake of sparking
further discussion that a fully or partially denationalized world is inevitable,4
and examining what effect the denationalization of identity may have on the
relationship between the individual and the law. Examining current legal struc-
tures through new lenses can help us anticipate how they might change. From
whence do the rules we feel compelled to follow come? What might individuals
who do not recognize political borders consider binding law? I argue that a na-
tion state-based legal system is ill suited to a world of multiple identities. Legal
scholars need to consider new theories of the law and the legal institutions that
result. This Note proposes a global legal culture as an alternative legal philoso-
phy and structure, one that can help the legal profession envision how to alter
existing legal institutions and build new ones. The changes considered are grad-
ual, even generational, and are not meant to replace existing structures entirely.
2. Peter Spiro has commented on the new postnational reality of citizenship: "Where
sovereign-subject relations were once analogized to the relationship of parent and child (a product
of nature and hence indissoluble) and more recently to marriage (voluntary and terminable, but
also singular), we may be moving towards a paradigm in which the more appropriate analogy is to
membership in a club or civic association, in a class of affiliation that does not necessarily constrain
other attachments." Peter J. Spiro, Dual Nationality and the Meaning of Citizenship, 46 EMORY L.J.
1411, 1416-17 (1997).
3. See, e.g., Saskia Sassen, The Need to Distinguish Denationalized and Postnational, 7 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEG. STUD. 575, 576-78 (2000); see also Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Proposals for Reforming the
Administrative Procedure Act: Globalization, Democracy and the Furtherance ofa Global Public Inter-
est, 6 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 397, 407-10 (1999). For an idea of how radical this concept is, see
Louis Henkin's writings on international law: "[O1rdinarily, nationhood is the unspoken assump-
tion of political life. But the nation ('state') is not only a political conception; it is also a fundamen-
tal legal construct with important consequences. Statehood-who is and shall be a state-has
been one of the major political issues of our day." Louis HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE: LAW AND
FOREIGN POLICY 15 (2d ed. 1979).
4. 1 presume a denationalized world for the sake of stimulating discussion, while acknowledg-
ing that some legal scholars find the notion of complete denationalization to be implausible. I do
believe, however, that partial denationalization, at least in terms of individual and corporate iden-
tity, has already begun to occur.
CHANGING IDENTITIES AND CHANGING LAW
But they have profound implications for nation-states, the legal profession, and,
most importantly, the man on the street in Delhi or Kansas City.
Part I of this Note discusses changing concepts of citizenship and identity, fo-
cusing on their psychological implications. There has been an explosion of excel-
lent literature exploring the implications of globalization for citizenship and
identity in the last ten years.5 This Note supports that work by providing three ex-
amples of how psychological dimensions of individual identity are changing, and
how that change is affecting our world. The deeper project, which begins in Part
II, suggests that identity is becoming denationalized to such an extent that it will
fundamentally change the role of law in global society. Part II aggregates the frag-
mented identities of globalization and suggests that existing laws and legal sys-
tems cannot adequately respond to the reality of a world where political borders
no longer define community and identity. An alternative is the cultivation of a glo-
bal legal culture. Part III then presents and responds to possible arguments against
the idea of a denationalized world and a global legal culture. The conclusion
briefly considers what sort of institutional changes may result from this shift in
legal theory, with the intent of opening the door to further discussion.
I. CITIZENSHIP AND IDENTITY
A. Who Am I?
Each version of the postnational citizenship identity claim points
to the fact that as ties increase across national borders, people are
increasingly taking on commitments and identities that exceed
the bounds of the national society and its members. Globalization,
in this account, reconstitutes us in the deepest personal ways; it has
important imaginative and emotional and moral effects on all of
us.6-Linda Bosniak
Citizenship has traditionally been defined as a state-based identity, as
5. For perhaps the best exploration of nationality, loyalty, identity, and law, see Linda Bosniak,
Citizenship Denationalized, 7 IND. J. GLOBAL LEG. STUD. 447 (2000); see also APRIL CARTER, THE PO-
LITICAL THEORY OF GLOBAL CITIZENSHIP (2001); Anupam Chander, Diaspora Bonds, 76 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1005 (2001); Thomas M. Franck, Clan and Superclan: Loyalty, Identity and Community in Law
and Practice, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 359 (1996).
6. Bosniak,supra note 5, at 485.
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"participation in and membership of the nation-state."7 Citizenship, however,
may be considered more expansively to include participation in, and member-
ship of, any community or communities, usually with associated obedience to
some sort of legal code or culture.8 In this sense, citizenship is the active imple-
mentation of identity. While political citizenship plays a role in one's identity,
this Note suggests a future in which citizenship is determined by a chosen, con-
scious sense of identity. Ultimately, a free and wide-ranging discussion of new
theories of identity and citizenship should accept that identity and citizenship
may be defined in a number of ways.
9
Great emphasis is placed on national identity in both ethnically homoge-
neous and artificial nations (where borders are not drawn along historical
cultural/racial divides). Nothing identifies a traveler as much as nationality;
while even race and gender may lose their emphasis in a collective of travelers,
nationality remains a major identifier. But we now live in a world where the
nation-state is beginning to lose its primacy as a source of identity. This Note
anticipates a future in which people in many parts of the world, particularly in
cosmopolitan areas, envision themselves as having multiple identities or none at
all. Communities will drift together and intermingle, more like liquids than
solids. Many parts of the earth may resemble a sort of aggregated border town: a
free-wheeling, lively mix of languages and cultures. In border towns there is a
sense of lawlessness, or rather a sense that the law doesn't apply. There is little
certainty as to which country one is in at any one time: signs are bilingual and
both currencies are accepted on either side of the border. If something is illegal
in one country an individual can simply stroll across the border and sell it, make
it, or do it on the other side. And this recognition of the geographical arbitrari-
ness of the law's application means that one is more likely to do the activity in
question even on the side of the fence where it is illegal.
Linda Bosniak uses the term "postnational citizenship" to explain this de-
clining primacy of state sovereignty and rising "transitional experience" of the
7. Kim Rubenstein, Citizenship in a Borderless World, in LEGAL VISIONS OF THE 21ST CENTURY:
ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF JUDGE CHRISTOPHER WEERAMANTRY 183 (Antony Anghie & Garry Sturgess
eds., 1998).
8. Other theories suggest that it need not even consider the law. For a short summary of vari-
ous definitions, see Linda Bosniak, Multiple Nationality and the Postnational Transformation of Cit-
izenship, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 979, 1000 (2002).
9. Id. at 1001 ("Once we begin to think about citizenship as itself a plural concept.., the idea
of citizenship's increasing postnationality can seem more plausible and more meaningful.").
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individual." Robert Holton has written that globalization has been extending its
"hybridizing thrust" for centuries. "Just as the idea of biological race is a spuri-
ous basis for social and cultural distinction, so the idea of distinct cultures de-
fined by purely endogenous characteristics is equally spurious from an analytical
point of view."" The vision of a world with increasingly stratified divisions has
received considerable attention of late, highlighted by writers such as Samuel
Huntington. 2 But this vision of distinct and irreconcilable societies lacks depth
and threatens to subordinate the complexity of the individual to an academic
grouping of people. It tells a good story, but an incomplete one.
B. Examples of Denationalizing Identity
There are many phenomena commonly used to portray globalization as a
force of increased mobility and interconnectivity, but few that pinpoint evidence
of how individuals and nations have changed their concepts of identity. In con-
trast, the denationalized corporation, as a model of the global possibilities for
chosen identity and chosen law, is much better documented. s What follows are
three examples of how the fragmentation of identity and citizenship is already
taking place in various legal and social permutations.
10. Id. at 991-92.
11. Robert Holton, Globalization's Cultural Consequences, 570 ANNALS 140, 150-51 (2000).
12. See generally SAMUEL HUNTINGTON, THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS AND THE REMAKING OF THE
WORLD ORDER (1996).
13. Even though many small corporations are extremely diffuse with regards to where they pay
taxes and maintain assets; they are actively exercising a form of chosen identity. Global corporations
are often referred to as transnational corporations (TNCs) because these companies operate virtu-
ally without political borders. There has been an explosion in the use of risk-spreading and tax-
avoiding global devices such as offshore banking, foreign subsidiaries, and tax shelters. In one of
the most blatant renouncements of national identity, hundreds of American companies are incor-
porating in income tax-free Bermuda, choosing "profits over patriotism." David Cay Johnston,
U.S. Corporations Are Using Bermuda to Slash Tax Bills, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2002, at A l. The use of
over 800 subsidiary tax shelters helped Enron avoid paying any income tax for four of the past five
years. See Citizens for Tax Justice, Less Than Zero: Enron's Income Tax Payments, 1996-2000, (Jan.
17, 2002), http://www.ctj.org/html/enron.htm. Adam Weinberg, co-founder of the reform group
Democracy Matters, has noted that U.S. law bars foreign corporations from giving money to U.S.
political campaigns and asked whether a transnational corporation like Enron should be consid-
ered a foreign corporation under such laws. John Nichols, Enron's Global Crusade, THE NATION,
Mar. 4, 2002, at 14. International businesses are already acting to minimize the significance of na-
tional legal systems. Litigation of international business disputes in national courts has decreased
rapidly in the past two decades. Independent global and regional dispute resolution bodies have
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1. The Growth in Multiple Citizenship
a. Changing Political Identities
No country remains unaffected by issues of migration and citizenship. Rich
countries receive waves of legal and illegal migrants, chasing opportunity or flee-
ing danger or hunger. For a number of years Australia encouraged immigration,
and the country now faces the tensions of a society with a large naturalized popu-
lation. The United States no longer actively promotes naturalization of foreign
residents, resulting in a society that perceives of itself as less of a 'melting pot' than
it has historically claimed to be. 4 Israel is a land of immigrants; its Law of Return
lets all Jews return and take citizenship. Many of the migrants who flee to South
Africa, looking for economic opportunity, are undocumented and unrecognized.
Most significantly, multiple and dual citizenships are increasingly common. 5
been formed. Contracts are much more likely to be based on a model of the International Cham-
ber of Commerce than a national standard.
These changes have also begun to effect how corporations perceive themselves. Fortune 500
companies are used to almost seamless cross-cultural and cross-linguistic operation. Almost ten
years ago Masao Miyoshi wrote, "a recent tendency toward lesser national identification and
greater corporate self-interest is discernible." Masao Miyoshi, A Borderless World? From Colonial-
ism to Transnationalism and the Decline of the Nation-State, 19 CRITICAL INQUIRY 726, 737 (1993). As
an example, Miyoshi used Yaohan, a Japanese grocery chain that moved its headquarters, first to
Brazil and then to Hong Kong, taking advantage of lower tax rates. Id. at 737. The secret to their
modern success is that "TNCs are unencumbered with nationalist baggage. Their profit motives
are unconcealed. They travel, communicate, and transfer people and plants, information and
technology, money and resources globally." Id. at 749.
The cosmopolitan model is already being actively followed by these corporations. At the same
time, corporations are also exhibiting the potential for the sort of global responsibility that may be
cultivated by a global legal culture. In Australia, an enforceable Corporate Code of Conduct Bill
2000 was proposed to create obligations in place of voluntary conduct controls. Ben Saul, In the
Shadow of Human Rights: Human Duties, Obligations, and Responsibilities, 32 COLUM. HUM. RTS.
L. REv. 565, 598 (2001). But see Adelle Blackett, Global Governance, Legal Pluralism and the Decen-
tered State: A Labor Law Critique of Codes of Corporate Conduct, 8 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD.
401, 402 (arguing that codes of conduct are just a new form of labor regulation, with limited effi-
cacy in achieving their claimed goals).
14. Peter Spiro has referred to the current situation in the United States as a "citizenship
dilemma," where exclusionary policies are considered immoral and legally impracticable but
inclusion threatens a loss of clarity as to national identity. Peter J. Spiro, The Citizenship Dilemma,
51 STAN. L. REV. 597, 599 (1999) (book review).
15. Amy Cortese, As Rules Ease, More Citizens Choose to Fly 2 Flags, N.Y. Times, July 15,2001, at
3-10. See generally Spiro, supra note 2.
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During the Westphalian era, exclusive citizenship was regarded as a vital
means of protecting the nation and national identity. 6 U.S. law originally held
that citizenship could be revoked on certain grounds, including naturalization in
another nation-state or even marriage to foreigners by American women (but not
men)." These grounds were extended in 1940 to include, among others, voting in
a foreign election. 8 The Supreme Court recognized the danger of statelessness
and subsequently restricted Congress' power to strip citizenship. "Citizenship is
man's basic right for it is nothing less than the right to have rights. Remove this
priceless possession and there remains a stateless person, disgraced and degraded
in the eyes of his countrymen."' 19 The law of citizenship softened further in 1964
when the Supreme Court rejected the previously accepted assumption that a nat-
uralized citizen could lose U.S. citizenship by residing in her country of origin for
three years.2" This was soon followed by Afroyim v. Rusk, in which the Court held
that citizenship could not be taken away because an individual voted in a foreign
election.2' Over subsequent decades, the United States has chosen to take a highly
hands-off position on citizenship. It technically still does not favor dual citizen-
ship, but no recent action is known as a result of an individual taking or retaining
foreign citizenship.22 The government does not attempt to remove citizenship,
nor question the holding of foreign citizenship, unless there is a concern over
national security or criminal activity.23 The United States does not attempt to track
and record the number of dual citizens, but the total "may be quite large."24 The
16. This is true only of the past two centuries. Prior to that, self-governance was often encour-
aged and multiple loyalty was common. See Franck,supra note 5, at 377-78.
17. T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Between Principles and Politics: U.S. Citizenship Policy, in FROM MI-
GRANTS TO CITIZENS: MEMBERSHIP IN A CHANGING WORLD 119, 135 (T. Alexander Aleinikoff &
Douglas Klusmeyer eds., 2000) [hereinafter FROM MIGRANTS TO CITIZENS].
18. Id. at 136.
19. Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 64 (1958) (emphasis in original).
20. Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163 (1964).
21. Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967).
22. There are four ways in which one can technically claim dual citizenship: being born in the
United States to a foreign parent; being born in a foreign country to parents of two different
countries, including one American; renouncing foreign citizenship during the U.S. naturalization
process, when the foreign country does not regard expatriation as a result of U.S. naturalization;
or naturalizing in a foreign country, then resuming American citizenship. FROM MIGRANTS TO
CITIZENS, Supra note 17, at 138-39.
23. See Chander, supra note 5, at 1040 n. 179. Whether this attitude changes in the post-September
11 overhaul of national security remains to be seen.
24. FROM MIGRANTS TO CITIZENS, supra note 17, at 139. For a more complete summary of the his-
tory of citizenship in the United States, see Franck,supra note 5, at 378-80.
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rationale behind forcing an individual to declare sole allegiance to the single state
has lost much of its value.
25
This is equally true for other nations. The lack of importance attached to
determining citizens' "loyalty" is evident from the increasing number of
countries that allow citizenship to be retained even if an individual is natural-
ized elsewhere. 26 Since 1977, Canada has allowed its citizens to hold multiple
nationalities without any restrictions, and naturalized citizens need not
renounce their prior citizenship. 27 Most European countries allow for dual citi-
zenship. Many sources of immigrants, especially emigrant countries such as
Turkey, Colombia, Italy, and the Dominican Republic, also allow members of
the "diaspora" to retain citizenship if naturalized in another country.28 Single
national loyalty may become a quaint anachronism. Though this does not neces-
sarily lessen the fervor of nationalism (some immigrants are among the most fer-
vent patriots), it does allow individuals to exercise some choice of identity/
affiliation. International and national law's increasing acceptance of dual
nationality-without any evident catastrophic consequences-weakens the
validity of the statist claim to singular loyalties.
The increasing acceptance of dual and multiple citizenship shows that even
nations themselves no longer emphasize citizenship as a primary definition of
who we are. As we develop our own sense of belonging to multiple communities,
the diaspora model becomes more appropriate. The possibility of exerting auton-
omy in our identity fulfills Stephen Dedalus's declaration of independence from
imposed identity.29 Thomas Franck has portrayed the new world of autonomous
25. Peter Spiro has argued that dual citizenship should be embraced by the United States, and
that the oath renouncing foreign allegiances be eliminated entirely. Such a change, he argues,
would be a significant recognition of the new nature of citizenship. Spiro,supra note 2, at 1479-84.
26. An incomplete list includes Canada, Argentina, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Re-
public, El Salvador, France, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Panama, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.
FROM MIGRANTS TO CITIZENS, supra note 17, at 140. These nations have found it more useful to re-
tain individuals in their citizenship roles than punish them for their decision to legally recognize
their habitation in another nation.
27. Donald Galloway, The Dilemmas of Canadian Citizenship Law, in FROM MIGRANTS TO CITI-
ZENS,supra note 17, at 99.
28. Chander, supra note 5, at 1040-41; see also Cortese, supra note 15.
29. "1 will not serve that in which I no longer believe, whether it call itself my home, my father-
land, or my church: and I will try to express myself in some mode of life or art as freely as I can and
as wholly as I can, using for my defence the only arms I allow myself to use-silence, exile and
cunning." JAMES JOYCE, A PORTRAIT OF THE ARTIST AS A YOUNG MAN 268 (1916).
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identity as almost a fait accompli.3" He distinguishes it from the pre-Westphalian
era, during which individuals often maintained multiple national identities, be-
cause the rulers and legal systems of that time were imposed, not chosen."
Now, in the twenty-first century, the realities of social interaction,
conflict resolution, economic, scientific, and cultural develop-
ment, and ecological and resource management have combined
with various facets of the communications revolution to point us
towards a global civil society. ... In short, a community is emerg-
ing in which, for the first time, individuals are free to choose the
components of their identities and to manifest a free choice of af-
finities. They are liberated to express associational preferences.32
A further element of the citizenship debate is the existence of stateless peoples.33
Significant stateless populations include Bhutanese living in Nepal and India;
Bidoons in Kuwait; Kurds in Syria and Iraq; and minority populations in
Burma.34 After fifty years of stateless existence, the Palestinian people still face a
lack of recognition. The United Nations and some states issue refugee docu-
ments and/or traveling documents or special citizenship, but these are all piece-
meal, temporary solutions. For example, Israeli authorities control the issuance
of passports to Palestinians in the occupied territories, yet the passports do not
provide recognition equivalent to Israeli citizenship. This is also true in other
Arab countries, where Palestinian residents are often issued traveling docu-
ments without the protection of full citizenship.35 In addition to causing obvious
practical problems for millions of people, the dilemma of statelessness bolsters
the case for a theory of identity that is not restricted to political borders, and
makes the development of transnational legal regulations all the more necessary.
30. See Thomas M. Franck, Community Based on Autonomy, 36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 41
(1997).
31. Id. at 45.
32. Id. at 64.
33. "The term 'stateless person' means one who is not considered as a national by any State
under the operation of its law." Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, art. I
(1954), at http'//www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/o-c_sp.htm.
34. THE STATE OF THE WORLD'S REFUCEES 1997-98, at 224-61 (1997).
35. Palestinians: Legal Status (Nov. 2001), http://www.medea.be/site.html?page= 1 0&lang=
en&doc= 179.
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b. The Shady Side of Changing Citizenship
The Finor Organization provides offshore banking services from its head-
quarters in Panama. It also runs a healthy secondary business in what it calls "ID
products." These include secondary passports, titles of nobility,36 and-for the
discount shopper-"camouflage passports," documents made to resemble those
of Rhodesia or other countries that no longer exist.37
Although many of the services are global vanity plates, secondary passports
are much more significant. Finor claims to be able to provide citizenship from
any of fifteen different countries in sixty to ninety days. The process Finor
undertakes is completely legal. It even has devised means by which to obtain
citizenship under a different name, if one so desires. Most of the programs pro-
vide "economic citizenship," which does not grant the holder permanent resi-
dency. Visa-free travel is possible, however, to many countries. Its Central
American program is one of its most heavily promoted, and Finor advertises
that it will allow for "naturalization in Spain within an abbreviated time of only
two years' residence in Spain."38 Finor claims to be able to provide passports
from a variety of locations (though the specific countries are not listed) including
Central America, Caribbean Island, Eastern Europe, Central Europe, and even
the European Union, for fees ranging from $15,000 to $150,000. 39
While such activities might technically be legal, there is an instinctive desire
to classify them as illegitimate at best. Media sources in the United States and
36. See Titles of Nobility, The Finor Organization, http://www.finor.com/en/nobility.htm (last
visited Jan. 29, 2003) ("Vacant Noble Surnames from which you can choose YOURS; Have your
noble title officially recognized in Spain ... Choose from the following: Lord & Lady, Baron &
Baroness, Count & Countess, Viscount & Viscountess, Marquis & Marchioness, Earl & Duchess,
Laird & Knecht .. " A single title costs US$1,000; a pair costs US$1,600).
37. See Offshore Banking and Privacy Center, The Finor Organization, http'J/www.finor.com/
offshore banking-centre.htm (last visited Jan. 29, 2003). Disclaimer: The author cannot (and will
not) independently verify the quality of these services.
38. See Central American Passport and Citizenship Program, The Finor Organization, http:/
www.finor.com/en/caapp.htm (last visited Jan. 29, 2003). Details of the Central American package
include: "COST: US$35,000 FULL PACKAGE INCLUDES: Passport, National ID Card,
Driver's License, Birth Certificate, Baptism Certificate, Police Certificate. COST: US$25,000
BASIC PACKAGE INCLUDES: Passport, National ID Card, Driver's License. COST:
US$15,000. DISCOUNT PACKAGE INCLUDES: Passport only." Id.
39. See Second Passport, Nationality and Residency Programs Comparison Chart, The Finor Orga-
nization, http://www.finor.com/en/countries-comparison-chart.htm (last visited Jan. 29, 2003).
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Europe are constantly reporting on the epidemic of illegal immigration from
Africa, Asia, and South America. The emphasis is on the illegal nature of the
migration, portrayed by speedboats on moonless nights and boxcars full of
human cargo. Yet it is possible to buy the legal right to undertake exactly the
same migration, but by first-class airline instead of a cargo ship. This is the
absurdity of modern "exclusionary" citizenship.
Tonga has one of the world's most flexible citizenship policies. Since the
19 80s it has had a significant influx of foreign currency through a program in
which individuals can purchase Tongan citizenship. Indeed, a visitors bureau's
website casually mentions, "For the visitor who wishes to eventually become
permanent there are different courses of action I have heard. Of course, one op-
tion is to purchase a Tongan passport, although how long this option will be
available is not known to me. This option has been taken up by many Asians and
for them is [sic] seems to have been satisfactory."4 Although a purchased Ton-
gan passport gives the holder a different status from naturalized citizens, it is ap-
parently a satisfactory tool for individuals insecure in their current status, and is
sufficient to help them travel internationally and fade into the global collage.
2. The Return of Pirates to the High Seas
A variety of international groups are held to exemplify the de-emphasis of
the nation-state, the most popular being benign groups, such as Amnesty Inter-
national, that operate across national boundaries and from a self-proclaimed
global position. But less publicly applauded transnational groups also exist, pi-
rates being among the most serious and most denationalized. Pirates can be dis-
tinguished from other far-reaching criminal groups, such as the Italian or
Russian mafia. The latter are national groups that operate internationally, much
like corporations; pirates are unaffiliated groups of individuals operating on the
40. See Tonga Visitors Bureau, http://www.tongatapu.net.to/tonga/islands/default-tvb.htm
(last visited Jan. 29, 2003). In an unusual twist, the official court jester of Tonga embezzled mil-
lions of dollars of the fees and has since disappeared. See Tonga's Jester has Last Laugh, BBC NEWS,
Oct. 6, 2001, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/asia-pacific/newsid_1582000/1582739.stm.
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open seas, often forming and dissolving after only a short period of time.4' Both
modern and historical pirates represent a diversity ofethnicities and identities.42
Harboring where they can without being noticed and selling their loot to
the highest bidder, pirates have recently reemerged as a sign of the growing lack
of nation-state control.43 Piracy has been called "a troubling symptom of a new
world order, one shaped by a fierce Darwinian struggle in the feral markets of
modern international trade."" This is only as true as the fact that street crime
and financial fraud are symptoms of "fierce Darwinian struggle," a struggle that
is accepted as a fundamental aspect of modern human society. Piracy, however,
41. The modern definition of piracy covers seizure of both ships and aircraft. This section of the
Note can be extrapolated to cover such acts, which also have a clearly denationalized aspect.
Piracy is defined as:
(a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for
private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and
directed:
(i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or
property on board such ship or aircraft;
(ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdic-
tion of any State;
(b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with
knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft;
(c) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in subpara-
graph (a) or (b).
U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, art. 101, Montego Bay, Dec. 10, 1982, reprinted in ALFRED
P. RUBIN, THE LAW OF PIRACY 391 (1988).
42. Compare DAVID CORDINGLY, UNDER THE BLACK FLAG: THE ROMANCE AND THE REALITY OF
LIFE AMONG THE PIRATES 12-15 (1996) ("The pirates who operated in the West Indies [in the 17th
century] were drawn from a number of seafaring nations and many were black slaves, so there
was no sense of national identity to unite them .... [Tihe largest number, around 35 percent, were
native Englishmen; next came men born in the American colonies, around 25 percent of the total;
20 percent came from the West Indian colonies, mostly Jamaica, Barbados and the Bahamas; 10
percent of the pirates were Scottish; 8 percent were Welsh; and there was a scattering of Swedish,
Dutch, French, Spanish, and Portuguese.... [A] considerable number of the men on the pirate
ships were black") with Jack Hitt, Bandits in the Global Shipping Lanes, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE,
Aug. 2o, 2ooo, at 36, 38-40 (describing the 1999 attack on a cargo ship: "there were 12 pirates on
board-as multicultural as their 18th century avatars: 7 Indonesians, 3 Malaysians and 2
Thais.... [T]he pirate king.., spoke four or five languages, including grammatically perfect
English.").
43. See Hitt, supra note 42, at 36.
44. Id. at 39.
CHANGING IDENTITIES AND CHANGING LAW
is unique in that it is an example of activity undertaken with a denationalized
mentality.
45
It is not a coincidence that the last time pirates ruled the seas, from the
fifteenth to eighteenth century, was just before the rise of the Westphalian
nation-state. Janice Thomson describes the pre-1900 period as one in which vio-
lence was "democratized, marketized, and internationalized. Nonstate violence
dominated the international system.... The identity of suppliers or purchasers
meant almost nothing."46 At that time identity was still highly denationalized
and the multi-racial pirate crew was representative of the time. Pirates devel-
oped sophisticated global networks, creating their own boundary-less cultures,
languages and flags. 47 We are de facto returning to that political time. Pirates are
the new, but paradoxically the old, threat-affiliated individuals that do not re-
tain national/patriotic identity. The definition of modern piracy specifically
notes events that take place for "private ends" on the high seas or outside any
State's jurisdiction. It is a crime without borders, and thus highly difficult to
combat successfully.
In 1994, Thomson put piracy at the center of an analysis of how the state
achieved a "monopoly on violence." She asked, "What explains the elimination of
nonstate violence from global politics?"48 Yet in the eight years since then, non-
state violence has exploded, most publicly in the form of terrorism and piracy. The
Piracy Centre was created under the auspices of the International Chamber of
Commerce (ICC) in October 1992 in response to this rising problem. Financed
primarily by ship owners and insurance companies, it is based in Kuala Lumpur
45. Those held responsible for the 9/11 tragedy are another criminal example of the growth of
the diaspora and multi-dimensional identities. It is likely that many Al-Qaeda fighters would pro-
fess loyalty to a nation, or certainly a town or family, in addition to their Muslim belief. But they
have chosen to lend their identities, and lives, to an ideological group that thinks globally. While
AI-Qaeda is destructive and malevolent, it is structurally highly denationalized and progressive.
Hence this battle, fought between a Westphalian nation-state and a diffuse, modern coalition, is
asymmetrical and unlikely to be resolved in a traditional manner.
46. JANICE E. THOMSON, MERCENARIES, PIRATES, AND SOVEREIGNS: STATE-BUILDING AND EXTRA-
TERRITORIAL VIOLENCE IN EARLY MODERN EUROPE 3 (1994). Even under the nation-state structure,
violence has always been an internationalized phenomenon. For example, the eighteenth century
French army was one-third foreigners, and thousands of mercenaries fought for the British in the
American War of Independence. Id. at 10.
47. Id. at 48. Piracy was a form of active rejection of the nation-state, many pirates coming from
persecuted or oppressed subclasses. See id. at 43-68.
48. Id. at 3.
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because a large percentage of piracy takes place in that region.49 But it is increas-
ingly prevalent beyond the seas of Southeast Asia. Pirates have boarded every-
thing from vacation yachts off the coast of Corfu to massive oil tankers operating
near Singapore.5" According to a 2000 Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships
report, there were 469 piracy attacks in that year, representing a fifty-seven per-
cent increase in pirate attacks over 1999, four and a half times the total for 199 1.L
The report also claimed that piracy was probably significantly underreported.
Part of the problem is that the shipping industry, the main focus of attack
for modern pirates, is itself a highly denationalized and deterritorialized
business. These corporations use nations as necessary labels of convenience-
nothing more than flags of identification. Most commercial ships are registered
in ports of convenience that have minimal taxation and regulation, including
Panama, Costa Rica, and Singapore. The crews are as diverse as the pirate crews;
the high seas have always been free, deregulated and borderless.5 2 This new
battleground of pre-Westphalian forces is among the first signs of our return to
a denationalized world.
3. Activism Without Borders
Mainstream media takes every possible opportunity to poke fun at global ac-
tivists. One favorite report mocked a woman at the 2001 World Social Forum in
Brazil when she loudly complained that an ATM in Rio de Janeiro would not ac-
cept her Dutch bankcard, the obvious point of ridicule being her reliance on the
same global banking networks that she was protesting against.
Though this view ignores the real concerns of "anti-globalization" protest-
ors (who are actually pro-local development, pro-environment, pro-labor, or one
of a dozen other permutations), it does reflect a deeper point: anti-globalization
protestors, more so than their critics, have already accepted the new state of the
world and begun to envision the future societies that can/may be created. Global
49. See ICC, The IMB Piracy Reporting Centre, at http://www.iccwbo.org/ccs/
menuimbpiracy.asp (last visited Jan. 29, 2003).
50. Helen Gibson, High Seas: A Plague of Pirates, TME MAC., Aug. 18, 1997, http:l
home.wanadoo.nl/ m.bruyneel/a rchive/modern/plague.htm.
51. ICC, Piracy Attacks Rise to Alarming New Levels, ICC Report Reveals, at http:/f
www.iccwbo.org/ccs/ newsarchives/2001/piracyreport.asp (last visited Jan. 29, 2003).
52. The crew of the ship attacked in Hitt's article included crewmembers from Malaysia, Bang-
ladesh, Scotland, Ghana, and Indonesia. See generally Hitt,supra note 42.
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activists are in fact a highly cosmopolitan collective of individuals of diverse
nationalities gathering in global cities to contest dominant capitalist ideologies. 3
They are united far more by ideology than nationality. Furthermore, they utilize
Internet communication 4 and hold sophisticated simultaneous solidarity
protests (for example, protests were held in many cities in France supporting the
demonstrators at the 1999 WTO meeting in Seattle). Most importantly, anti-
globalists are not demanding protection for any group-they see themselves as
representing humanity:
Amnesty International and Greenpeace are emblematic of this
transnational militancy with an identity.. . that can't really be
tied very specifically to any one country or even any region....
These networks of transnational activity, conceived both as a
project and as a preliminary reality, are producing a new orienta-
tion toward political identity and community. Cumulatively, they
can be described as rudimentary, generally unacknowledged
forms of participation in a new phenomenon, global civil society."
"Anti-globalization" has become such a pejorative term that many activists
now refer to themselves as global activists. By identifying them as activists for
the entire globe, this term better reflects the cosmopolitan nature of their ideol-
ogy. Aaron Pollack has described the recent history of international activism as
an increased cross-movement coordination as well as a greater focus on re-
gional and 'global' organizing that is a response to global economic restructur-
ing and both the regionalization and the globalization of the world economy
that this entails."56 The examples he provides include the cooperation of NGOs,
53. See Ha-Joon Chang et al., How Should the Left Respond to Globalization, 48 DISSENT 9, 14
(2001).
54. See, e.g., Global Issues that Affect Everyone, http://www.globalissues.org/ (last visited Jan. 30,
2003); Out There News, http://www.megastories.com/index.shtml (last visited Jan. 30, 2003); Glo-
balization Issues, About, Inc., http://globalization.about.com/cs/antiglobalization/index.htm (last
visited Jan. 30, 2003) (general resource guides and information centers for global activists).
55. Richard Falk, The Making of Global Citizenship, in GLOBAL VisioNs: BEYOND THE NEW
WORLD ORDER 47-48 (Jeremy Brecher et al. eds., 1993).
56. Aaron Pollack, Cross-Borders, Cross-Movement Alliances in the Late 1990s, Global Solidarity
Dialogue, at http://www.antenna.nl/- waterman/pollack.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2003).
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built upon relationships made at U.N.-sponsored events.57 To a certain extent
the global cooperation of modern activism is due simply to the perceived exist-
ence of common enemies. These "enemies," including the IMF, WTO and
multi-national corporations, are those entities that most successfully utilize and
encourage the growth of global infrastructure.
A significant number of the most rabid protestors at global events identify
themselves as "anarchists." It is an untidy term, but one often used for self-identi-
fication of a person who does not recognize the authority of any government. An-
archists lack allegiance to any legal system; yet this definition of anarchism does
not necessarily reflect a sense of lack of social responsibility. On the contrary, an-
archists exhibit a heightened sense of duty to their self-defined communities, both
local and global, by actively protesting against perceived injustices. For these ac-
tivists, humanity as a whole is one level of community (a cosmopolitan model),
and national laws are seen to restrict the freedom of some members of that society.
The so-called "anti-globalization activists" are in fact leaders in the revolt
against the old school of the nation-state. They are at the forefront of true glo-
balism, collaborating and gathering strength from communities of ideas, often
gathering under the umbrella of NGOs or non-profit groups, and working to
create global networks of activist identity. This lack of traditional loyalty to the
nation-state has broad social and cultural parallels, in the transfer of loyalty to




58. A very incisive observation of this came not with regard to nationality, but to college foot-
ball. When Tyrone Willingham left his position as head coach as Stanford in January 2002 to ac-
cept a position at Notre Dame, many critics considered it a lack of loyalty. In response, Donald
Kennedy, president emeritus of Stanford, explained that all faculty members "are subject to a
widening set of loyalties that run well beyond the institution. The biologist who moves from Uni-
versity A to B for better facilities in which to pursue innovative research is being loyal to her
craft.... As for Tyrone Willingham, he will bring strong values and an African-American pres-
ence to a highly visible and influential program. He's loyal to his craft, too." Donald Kennedy, The
New School Spirit, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 5, 2002, at A 1.
Loyalty and identity exist on many levels: school, nation, profession, or personal interest. To
the question "What ever happened to loyalty?" Kennedy answered: "What happened to loyalty is
that it has been broken up into a lot of pieces in a highly complex world." Id. But Kennedy admits
"I rather liked the old world in which loyalty was easier to keep track of." Id. The one-
dimensional world of Westphalian nation-states, like old school loyalty, was easier to grasp intel-
lectually and emotionally, but this does not give it any better chance of surviving.
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C. National Identity and Alternative Models of Citizenship
1. The End of the Nation-State?
These three examples of tangible denationalization should convince most
readers that it is already a significant social phenomenon. But these merely hint
at much larger structural changes that may occur in the near future. Globaliza-
tion as denationalization suggests an alternative future to the global capitalist
model of unrestrained market competition mediated by nation-states and
heavily influenced by multinational corporations. Indeed, denationalization
may be a crucial force in preventing adversarial global competition from prop-
ping up the nation-state as a unit of exclusion.59 Linda Bosniak has suggested
that since citizenship is theoretically viable even without the nation-state, the
nation-state may disappear completely." This seems a bit extreme, as citizen-
ship, among other things, involves the exercise of legal rights and obligations.
While international human rights treaties list some basic human rights, they
mostly rely on nation-state implementation, and legal obligations are not yet
very developed for individual entities on the superstatist or substatist levels.6'
A subtler, two-dimensional form of denationalization appears more likely
to occur. First, nation-states will shrink in size and stature. The nation-state has
maintained its dominance in part by adjusting to the shape of preexisting "bor-
ders" of identity. The size of states shrink as the national structure is used as a
means of empowering preexisting identities of ethnicity, culture, or language.62
59. See Nareerat Wiriyapong, Thai PM Takes Harvard Tip Seriously, THE WORLD PAPE% Jan. 4,
2002, at http://www.worldpaper.com/2002/jan04/soc7.html (recounting the urgings of Thai
Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra that Thailand must develop a stronger sense of nationalism
to compete in the era of global capitalism).
60. See Bosniak,supra note 5, at 491.
61. Exceptions being the individuals tried for war crimes and genocide, primarily in the Inter-
national Criminal Tribunals of Rwanda (ICTR) and Yugoslavia (ICTY). See Gabrielle Kirk
McDonald, The International Criminal Tribunals: Crime & Punishment in the International Arena,
25 NovA L. REV. 463, 464-65, 483 (2001) (former judge of the ICTY reviewing the history and
achievements of the ICTY and ICTR).
62. See MICHAEL HARDT & ANTONIO NEGRI, EMPIRE 106 (2000) ("Whereas the concept of nation
promotes stasis and restoration in the hands of the dominant, it is a weapon for change and revo-
lution in the hands of the subordinated .. "). Eqbal Ahmad has noted that Islam, like other reli-
gions, has often been opposed to the concept of national identity. EQBAL AHMAD, CONFRONTING
EMPIRE: INTERVIEWS WITH DAVID BARSAMIAN 5-6 (2000). "[T]he idea of Pakistan was very strongly
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The number of independent nation-states has grown to 191 in 2001, with many
other movements for autonomy as yet unrecognized.63 Second, individuals will
recognize citizenship as simply a convenience, rather than an integral, inviolable
identity. As movement of individuals become as fluid as that of capital, nation-
states may adopt more libertarian legal theories, particularly with respect to con-
sensual laws, just as they have with respect to controls of capital and trade.64 But
at the same time, those laws that do remain may become more harmonized
among nation-states. A global norm will become pervasive, as it already has for
many fundamentals of business transactions, such as letters of credit and con-
tract terms.
"The end of the nation-state" is a popular sound bite used by futurist politi-
cal scientists (often with negative connotations). The importance attached to
such a phrase is its influence on the psyche of the individual and the subsequent
reaction of the individual to new political and social structures. Some theorists
have argued that social cohesiveness and citizen-based governance are already
myths, sustained in order to maintain social order. David Held claims that, "the
idea of a political community of fate-ofa self-determining collectivity-can no
longer be meaningfully located within the boundaries of a single nation-state
alone."65 Using Japan as an example, Jean-Marie Gu~henno observes, "One
finds no more citizens in Tokyo than one does in Washington. Japan is not a so-
ciety but the memory of a society; it mimics power relations.
' 6
"
It is important to clarify that this discussion does not envision the end of
communal identification. On the contrary, as nationalism perishes, individuals
opposed by the Islamic religious scholars of India. The reason for that was, among others, an ar-
gument on the part of the ulema, the religious scholars of Islam in India, that nationalism was an
anti-Islamic ideology, because nationalism proceeds to create boundaries where Islam is a faith
without boundaries." Id. at 5.
63. OFFICE OF THE GEOGRAPHER AND GLOBAL ISSUES, INDEPENDENT STATES OF THE WORLD, Inde-
pendent States of the World, Jan. 19, 2001, at http://www.state.gov/www/regions/ independent-
states.html.
64. As individuals escape the monopoly of the nation-state in the same way global business has,
laws that cannot be justified will be revoked or left unenforced.
65. David Held, Regulating Globalization?, in THE GLOBAL TRANSFORMATIONS READER 420, 423
(David Held & Anthony McGrew eds., 2000).
66. JEAN-MARIE GUEHENNO, THE END OF THE NATION-STATE 31 (Victoria Elliot trans., 1995).
She also considers the empowerment of the citizenry in a democratic nation-state to be illusory.
"With the same party in power for decades, a charade of democracy is staged [in Japan], and the
judicious choreography of these carefully limited confrontations is the Asian transposition of the
media jousts of modern America." Id. at 31-32
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will emphasize their remaining, more sustainable allegiances. Perhaps local gov-
ernment will regain its importance. Psychologically, individuals may come to see
local and transnational governance, and thus local and transnational democracy,
as the best forums in which to exercise their opinions. Andrew Linklater has
criticized the fact that national citizenship "has long been 'too puffed up and too
compressed.'... Higher and lower forms of citizenship... are evident within
the elementary steps which have been taken to represent ethnic minorities and
regions in international institutions and international law."67 Large nation-states
may even break up into smaller, more responsive and convenient districts of
governance. As Michael Sandel has written, "In the age of NAFTA the politics
of neighborhood matters more, not less. People will not pledge allegiance to vast
and distant entities, whatever their importance, unless those institutions are
somehow connected to political arrangements that reflect the identity of the par-
ticipants. '68 Local government may take back supremacy from the nation-state,
and new, non-geographically defined forms of governance may also develop.
These are not new or revolutionary ideas. In 1969 Karl Deutsch anticipated
that the nation-state would face threats from the "citizens' minds. '69 Deutsch pre-
dicted two main changes. The first was to move politics "one level down," to small
local groups.7' Deutsch described this as a desire for depoliticization, a term that
is highly applicable to the rhetoric of citizens in liberal democracies today who ex-
press disillusionment with national politics and renewed interest in localism. The
second alternative was to move politics "above the nation-state, up to the interna-
tional level." 7' Though Deutsch saw no immediate alternative to the nation-state,
he did not think that its dominance would last. "[T]he prospect before us is a
world of nation-states for the next 20,30, 50, or, perhaps, 80 years-that is, for the
next two or three generations."" His estimate places us right in the midst of what
he foresaw as an inevitable transformation, and he also prophesied the important
contribution technology and communication would make towards the end of the
67. ANDREW LINKLATER, THE TRANSFORMATION OF POLITICAL COMMUNITY 203 (1998).
68. Michael J. Sandel, America's Search for a New Public Philosophy, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY,
Mar. 1996, at 57, 74.
69. See KARL W. DEUTSCH, NATIONALISM AND ITS ALTERNATIVES 167-69 (1969).
70. Id. at 167.
71. Id. at 169; see also LINKLATER,supra note 67, at 203 ("Post-Westphalian arrangements which
break up the union of sovereignty, territoriality, citizenship and shared nationality can provide a
more effective means of reconciling the claims of universality and difference.").
72. DEUTSCH,supra note 69, at 171.
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nation-state.73 Deutsch had the common Cold War obsession with nuclear war,
emphasizing his vision of international peace simply as a means of basic self-
survival. The nation-state, he believed, would inevitably lead to conflict. He was
hopeful, however, that we would reach the point we are now approaching, a
world of the shrinking nation-state, as a starting point for an interconnectivity
that would finally release us from the specter of nuclear war.
2. Alternative Models
Citizenship is grounded in collective identification with a group, and evokes
corresponding emotional responses.74 This element of subjectivity is often forgot-
ten in conventional definitions of citizenship. Much has been written about the
tension between globalization and national or subnational cultural and social
norms. 75 My concern, however, is not with national cultures, but with individuals
and cultures, in the absence of borders that limit or define them.76 This Note as-
sumes that the preeminent nation-state will decay, psychologically and probably
73. Id. at 190 ("[Technology] pushes beyond wars and beyond the economic fences of nation-
states. It seems to push toward a pluralistic world of limited international law, limited, but grow-
ing, international cooperation, and regional pluralistic security communities.... [These develop-
ments] may preserve us, individuals and nations, for the next three or four decades, in which
nuclear war is all too possible.").
74. Bosniak, supra note 5, at 494. See also Franck, supra note 5, at 382 (recognizing that for some
people self-identification is achieved by loyalty to a nation and for many people identity is found
in other social groups).
75. See, e.g., Vivian Grosswald Curran, Romantic Common Law, Enlightened Civil Law: Legal
Uniformity and the Homogenization of the European Union, 7 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 63 (2001) (discuss-
ing the common-law legal characteristics of the European Union corresponding with elements in-
cluded in the non-legal domains of the civil-law European Union Member States). See generally
JOSEPH H. CARENS, CULTURE, CITIZENSHIP, AND COMMUNITY: A CONTEXTUAL EXPLORATION OF JUS-
TICE As EVENHANDEDNESS 161-76 (2000) (exploring the incompatibility of Canadian and Quebecois
identity).
76. Joseph Carens's study of Canadian and Quebecois identity is an example of the limited
institution-linked concept of identity. He assumes that a solution must include defining the iden-
tities involved, either by adjusting federalism, finding a means to strengthen both identities, or
embracing diversity and a common identity. What he does not consider is the possibility of es-
chewing classified identities all together and recognizing that solutions can be created that do not
require clear division of individuals' identities. Carens's "deep diversity" argument, borrowed
from Charles Taylor, does affirm the possibility of multiple political identities in one society. But
this is not the same as recognizing that there may be no need to define identity at all. CARENS, Supra
note 75, at 161-76.
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politically. As the dominance of the Westphalian system erodes, nationality will
constitute a less significant part of each individual's identity. Among the alterna-
tive models of citizenship that address this insufficiency, two are most prominent:
cosmopolitanism 77 and the diaspora. 8
The cosmopolitan model is a somewhat utopian vision of a human race con-
scious of its deterritorialized, united nature. Cosmopolitanism is based on
"openness" to others and an acceptance of difference between cultures and
people.79 Citizenship in the cosmopolis is based on the Enlightenment era belief
in a common moral identity, a linking of humanity without regard to political
definition.8" The common modern usage of "cosmopolitan" to describe young,
affluent urban culture reflects the ability of individuals within that culture to
interact across national, racial and ethnic boundaries. Global cities such as Lon-
don, New York, and Tokyo epitomize cosmopolitanism.8
The diaspora vision is a broader concept, traditionally used to describe how
displaced people maintain cultural, political, and social ties to their place of origin,
usually across national borders. It may be exercised by voting in elections or send-
ing financial support, but most often simply describes a sense of split identity.
77. See generally John Urry, The Global Media and Cosmopolitanism, Paper presented at the
Transnational America Conference, Bavarian American Academy, Munich (June, 2000), at http:/
/www.comp.lancs.ac.uk/sociology/soc056ju.html (exploring whether cosmopolitanism is becom-
ing more widespread with the development of the global media); COSMOPOLITAN CITIZENSHIP
(Kimberly Hutchings & Roland Dannreuther eds., 1999) (exploring the implications of conceptu-
alizing citizenship in the global context); Jeremy Wald ron, Minority Cultures and the Cosmopolitan
Alternative, 25 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 751 (1992) (exploring the vision of life, agency, and responsi-
bility that is implicit in cosmopolitanism).
78. See generally Chander, supra note 5; Spiro, supra note 14, at 618-25 (assessing subnational
communities and the new diasporas). "Diaspora" in this Note also covers the concept of "multiple
identities." See Franck, supra note 5, at 376-77. A third, distinct model sometimes used is "hybrid-
ization." See Holton,supra note 11, at 148-51.
79. Urry, supra note 77. Urry lists cosmopolitan indicators as including extensive mobility, the
capacity to consume places and environments, a curiosity and awareness of the world, a willingness
to take risks by virtue of encountering the "other," an ability to "map" one's own society and its cul-
ture in terms of a historical and geographical knowledge, semiotic skill to be able to interpret
images of various others, and an openness to other peoples and cultures. Id.
80. See COSMOPOLITAN CITIZENSHIP, supra note 77, at 11-19.
81. Saskia Sassen has written extensively on the growth and implication of global cities. Seegen-
erally SASKIA SASSEN, THE GLOBAL CITY: NEw YORK, LONDON, TOKYO (2nd ed. 2001); SASKIA SASSEN,
CITIES IN A WORLD ECONOMY (2nd ed. 2000); Saskia Sassen, The Global City: Introducing a Concept
and Its History, in MUTATIONS 104-15 (Rem Koolhaas et al. eds., 2001).
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Thomas Franck describes the modern era's sense of identity as "a handful of bird-
seed to be distributed among several feeding stations."82 One may maintain loyalty
to a country of birth, ancestry, or residence; one may even choose an identity un-
connected to any of the above. Though little used in legal debate, the diaspora
model most accurately reflects the complexity of postmodern human identity. In
an important recent essay Anupam Chander presents the diaspora model as a
basis for legal analysis, one that allows for individual choice in the definition of
communities. "In place of the statist insistence on a singular state loyalty or the cos-
mopolitan call for global citizenship, the diaspora model would permit individu-
als to construct national and transnational communities of their own choosing."83
This Note draws upon the diaspora model of changing individual identity.
The statist model responds awkwardly to issues of assimilation and multiple
nationalities. The cosmopolitan model does not suffer these limitations, but it
creates a false global identity that trivializes the deep cultural attachments to
place, race, and community. The diaspora model is cognizant that the world is in
reality inhabited by mixed, multi-dimensional identities, not homogeneity. "In a
world that is increasingly diasporan, full of crisscrossing loyalties, transborder
mobility, multinational political states, and transnational communities, neither
the statist nor the cosmopolitan paradigm fits." 84
The case of Olisadebe, the Polish soccer player, is most accurately seen as an ex-
ample of the diaspora. When pressed, he has described himself as "a bit Polish, but
more Nigerian."" When asked if he had betrayed his "land of birth," he replied:
I refuse to feel this way. I know there will be a debate about it in
Nigeria. While many would feel I did wrong, there will be others
who will see things my way. Personally though, I don't think I be-
trayed anybody. I am not the first Nigerian to have acquired for-
eign citizenship. I have Nigerian blood flowing in my veins and
nobody can take that away.86
82. Franck, supra note 5, at 377.
83. Chander, supra note 5, at 1007;see also Madhavi Sunder, Intellectual Property and Identity Pol-
itics: Playing With Fire, 4 J. GENDER RACE & JUST., 69, 90-98 (2000) (favoring the diasporic view of
culture and viewing cultural appropriation as an interaction between cultures rather than a "tak-
ing from a culture that is not one's own.").
84. Chander, supra note 5, at 1048.
85. Olisadebe Interview, supra note 1.
86. Id.
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Olisadebe is representative of the diaspora bonds spider webbing across the
world. He is of a generation comfortable with a transnational, transcontinental
identity, a generation that refuses to be pinned down to one territory. And not
just superior athletes and academics are crossing borders. Of much greater im-
pact are the millions of Africans crossing into Europe to work, and the millions
of Latinos into America. Moreover, the diaspora exists not only in the developed
world, though that is where the trend is most examined. Peru's last president
was of Japanese heritage;8 7 the current president is of Peruvian Indian blood and
Harvard-educated; and a majority of the country's population is descended from
Spanish settlers.
Understanding the complex, variable nature of identity presented by the
diaspora model is a crucial element in imagining new legal theories and institu-
tions. Each society's diversity of identity and citizenship "is always a matter of de-
gree, varying with the circumstances and over time. Vocabulary rarely allows for
this fluidity and shading, and, by falsifying the past, vocabulary may actually
block the future. 8 8 If we understand the interconnectivity and different levels of
identity incompletely, our possibilities will be restricted by our own lack of vision.
II. THE ABSENCE OF A "LEGAL CULTURE" AND THE NEED TO BUILD ONE
A vital concern of the contemporary lawyer should be the development of a
legal system that can support "global society." If individuals identify themselves
as non-national and thus not responsible for complying with national laws, ad-
ditional and alternative legal systems must be developed to avoid slipping into
anarchic relations. But all the possibilities of identity reviewed above point to-
wards a future in which coherent boundaries cannot be maintained within
which exclusive legal structures can be built.
International institutions are growing and adapting to serve some of the func-
tions of the nation-state. This Note suggests, however, that if the full possibility of
87. Interestingly, when forced to resign over corruption scandals, President Alberto Fujimori
fled to Japan, of which his parents were citizens. The Japanese government recognized him as a
full Japanese citizen and refused extradition even though he had never previously requested nor
claimed citizenship and technically could not have served as Peruvian president as a foreign citi-
zen. Fujimori Secures Japanese Haven, BBC NEWS, Dec. 12, 2000, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/
english/world/asia-pacific/newsid_ 1065000/1065667.stm.
88. Franck,supra note 5, at 368.
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blended and chosen identities comes to fruition, existing legal theories and insti-
tutions will not necessarily be sufficient. A theory of a world legal culture, on the
other hand, may encourage the growth of alternative institutions. It is necessary
to reimagine law and legal culture in a way that mirrors the new borderless world.
Part of this project is to propose new ways of looking at the law and to develop en-
tirely new structures that support these new ideas of how the law and individuals
can interact. Alternative institutions can be supported without proposing a total
revolution in legal thinking: abolition of existing institutions is not required. The
ideas below are meant simply to provide a base upon which to develop new legal
structures that will work alongside, and perhaps someday replace, nation state-
centered legal models.
The phrase "absence of a legal culture" has often been used to criticize emerg-
ing nations-sometimes as a convenient code for "uncivilized," reflecting an as-
sumption that there is only one correct form of legal culture. But the phrase may
more accurately be applied to the global realm, as there really is an absence of a
global legal culture, such that people and entities with denationalized identities
feel increasingly free to act with impunity. Individuals recognize some sense of le-
gality, but feel immune to it when visiting a different national jurisdiction, as if
carrying a form of diplomatic immunity. Thus the need exists to develop a legal
culture, a tradition of responsibility, with the intent of causing individuals to as-
sume the existence of duty. The bare structure of a legal culture may rest in part
on a theory of universal values or natural law, but these fundamental laws are con-
tested and have few bright-line borders.89 The preamble of the Charter of the
United Nations affirms a belief in "fundamental human rights, in the dignity and
worth of the human person. ' But the disagreement over "fundamental" rights
and obligations is as unresolved today as it was fifty years ago.
As we move beyond national identity, there is less sense of obligation to bodies
of government. Efforts are underway to counteract this, including the release by
the InterAction Council (IAC) of a draft Universal Declaration of Human
Responsibilities in 1997.9' While international law imposes various explicit
89. Even extreme examples, such as the murder of an innocent human being, may be contested.
Might a killing be justified in certain instances? Who is an innocent human being?
90. U.N. CHARTER, pmbl., cl.2.
91. Universal Declaration of Human Responsibilities, InterAction Council, http'/
www.asiawide.or.jp/iac/udhr/home.htm. See generally Saul, supra note 13, at 565 (providing an
analysis and (mostly negative) critique of the Declaration).
CHANGING IDENTITIES AND CHANGING LAW
duties on nations, the notion of individuals and other entities having responsibil-
ities is rarely discussed. The JAC anticipated this and has attempted to start a
dialogue about individuals without nations. The breadth of the Declaration has
been criticized for, among other things, addressing areas that are "the domain of
the arbiters and teachers of everyday morality-the home, the church and the
local school."92 This criticism implies that what behavior should be expected of
an individual is more an element of culture than of formal codified law. The
ethic of a global legal culture may be able to reconcile these views of morality and
legal responsibility.93
The cause of environmental protection has seen the most sustained effort,
and the most success, in promoting a sense of global responsibility. Pollution ig-
nores borders; environmental problems like global warming are challenges to
human society, not to any one community. The Stockholm Declaration of the
U.N. Conference on the Human Environment was a breakthrough, stating that
a healthy earth is linked to a general "responsibility to protect and improve the
environment for present and future generations."94 The trial of individuals for
violations of human rights is a second area of progress in developing an assump-
tion of global responsibility. The Pinochet case, though Pinochet was not
brought to trial, declared authoritatively that English courts will use universal
jurisdiction to try heads of state, even with claimed immunity, for committing
the international crime of torture.95 The ongoing trial of Slobodan Milosevic is
significant in part because his claim that the International Criminal Tribunal for
the former Yugoslavia is illegitimate is summarily dismissed by the world legal
community.9 6 At the same time, though with less publicity, the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda is continuing its work to bring a measure of jus-
92. Roland Rich, Universality, the Individual and International Law, Address at Australian
National University (Nov. 20, 1998).
93. For another model of how this division has been treated by a society, see infra text accompa-
nying notes 111-18, on Chinese legal history and the theories ofli andfa.
94. Stockholm Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, re-
printed in BASIC DOCUMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 21 (Harald Hohmann ed.,
1992).
95. See Regina v. Bow St. Metro, Stipendiary Magistrate, 2 W.L.R. 827 (H.L.) (1999).
96. See Ian Fisher, Power Drove Milosevic to Crime, Prosecutors Say as Trial Opens, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 13, 2002, at Al; Marlise Simons, Milosevic Is in Court as Trial Plan Is Set, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10,
2002, at A12.
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tice to that region.97 The relevant element of these examples is that they all point
to a growing sense of a global responsibility, a basis for a global legal culture.
Though these are exceptions to the dominance of the nation-state as ulti-
mate arbiter, they nevertheless reflect the deepening sense of complex identities,
and the need for creative institutional responses:
[H]uman institutions can [not] be so structured as to transcend
contemporaneous values held by individuals and groups, values
that fluctuate over time with the hopes and fears of those who
harbor them. Human values exist in transient relations of mutual
influence with the paths and choices that emerge as desirable and
undesirable to populations and individuals reacting to evolving
personal, social, political, cultural and economic circumstances at
98given moments.
This is a sophisticated model of identity, one with multiple dimensions, grey
areas, and interchangeable communities, but the discussion is still focused on de-
fining distinct levels of law. It is an inherently asymmetrical discussion, because
the complexity, distinctiveness and variability of identity do not align with the
formality and rigidity of law. Visions of a global legal structure do not necessar-
ily imply a global government. Governance is "the framework of rules, institu-
tions, and established practices that set limits and give incentives for the
behaviour of individuals, organizations and firms." 99 Forms of governance can
change and evolve without the establishment of an overarching, omnipotent
global government.
But legal systems are assumed to require rigid institutions of enforcement.
Louis Henkin wrote that the common tendency to trivialize international law
97. See generally Internews ICTR Reports, at http://www.internews.org/activities/ictr-reports/
ictr-reports.htm (last visited Jan. 30, 2003); International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda website,
at http:// www.ictr.org/ (last visited Jan. 30, 2003).
98. Curran, supra note 75, at 113-14.
99. UNDP Report 1999, Globalization with a Human Face, in THE GLOBAL TRANSFORMATIONS
READER, supra note 65, at 347.
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arises from the perception that there is no international society to enforce it.'" Is
it possible then to conceive of "law" that is practical for a world without clearly
delineated geographic jurisdictions? This is why this Note proposes the idea of
a global legal culture. For while it may be virtually impossible to create a single
appropriate legal system, a legal culture may be able to respond to these new glo-
balized identities and communities. There is little reason to think that moving
beyond our present structure of governance will lead to the collapse of society.
Indeed, "modern reliance on government to make law and establish order is not
the historical norm.''. There is nothing exceptional about developing diverse,
even contradictory, laws within the borders of a nation, so what is to prevent us
from eschewing borders altogether? In countries without a stable government,
order is still maintained. "In the absence of legal protection from the state in
most developing nations, it is extralegal law that regulates the assets of most
citizens. '"102 As long as individual entities expect to have rights and responsibili-
ties, even if the particular rights and responsibilities are unspecified, piecemeal
creation of legal standards and dispute resolution mechanisms will be sufficient
to fill the void created by denationalization.' 3 The result will be a deformalized,
decentralized dispute resolution network based on a global legal culture as a sus-
tainable form of "extralegal law."
Most discussions of world law address primarily the feasibility of global
courts. For example, functional bodies of "supranational adjudication" have
100. HENKIN,SUpra note 3, at 24-25 ("The tendency to dismiss international law reflects impres-
sions, sometimes summed up in the conclusion that it is not really law because society is not really
a society: the world of nations is a collection of sovereign states, not an effective body politic which
can support effective law."). Is it not possible that if nations themselves lose their monopoly on
identity, they will also cease to be identified as "effective body politicls] which can support effec-
tive law"?
101. BRUCE BENSON, THE ENTERPRISE OF LAW: JUSTICE WITHOUT THE STATE 2 (1990).
102. HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL 175 (2000). Recent scholarship argues that
there are always a number of "failed states" in which extralegal law dominates people's lives. The
Washington Quarterly recently ran an entire survey of failed nation-states. See Robert I. Rotberg,
The New Nature of Nation-State Failure, WASH. Q., Summer 2002, at 93. It mentions Pakistan,
Colombia, Indonesia and Sierra Leone as countries on the edge of "nation-state failure."
103. This "culture" means that the law applicable to any given situation will not necessarily be
strictly limited by a global constitution or statute. Global networks will adapt to particular situa-
tions, maintaining fluid, informal constructions. If we trust humanity to create a culture of rights
and responsibilities, much of the current stagnancy of nationalized law can be avoided. This
vision does not require perfect individuals. We can certainly maintain our selfishness while acqui-
escing to denationalized concepts of justice.
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been proposed by Laurence Helder and Anne-Marie Slaughter."° Brian Havel
has argued that supranational tribunals and courts may be permissible under the
U.S. Constitution."5 But an increase in supranational institutions should not be
mistaken for a world law. Rather, they are simply creating courts with universal
jurisdiction to hear certain limited types of cases. Even then geography will al-
ways limit world law; distance limits the practicality of interconnectedness. As
defined in the post-war period, transnational law "includefs] all law which reg-
ulates actions or events that transcend national frontiers," including cross-
border application of the laws of sovereign states. °6 Similarly, a new global legal
system will not necessarily exclude national laws; instead they will operate as one
type of institution to regulate social interactions. Harold Berman has proposed a
theory of an all-encompassing body of law-a world law-one that he compares
to the evolution of world organizations, communications, technology, and
travel." 7 This encourages us to examine each field as a network of diverse ele-
ments and structures, not as one overarching institution. A world law "will once
again combine inter-state law with the common law of humanity, on the one
hand, and the customary law of various world communities, on the other."'0 8
Berman's definition includes uniform global legal codes, such as the rules of air
traffic control."° But it also includes the customary law of various communities;
similarly, a global legal culture imagines as many laws and institutions as there
are communities, in the broad, non-geographical meaning of the word. Berman
refers to customs of small communities of individuals, but also to customary
world law "based on the contract practices of economic actors.."... The benefit of
looking at law as culture, instead of code, is that it becomes more malleable, ex-
tending beyond uncertain and unmarked lines.
104. Laurence R. Heifer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational
Adjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 273, 287 (1997).
105. Brian F. Havel, The Constitution in an Era of SupranationalAdjudication, 78 N.C. L. REv. 257
(2000) (arguing that Article III of the U.S. Constitution was not necessarily meant to be the exclu-
sive judicial power, and that even courts without review by U.S. federal courts may be constitu-
tional).
106. PHILIP C. JEssuP, TRANSNATIONAL LAW 2 (1956).
107. Harold J. Berman, World Law, 18 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1617 (1995).
108. Id. at 1622.
109. Id. at 1621.
110. Id. "When one speaks of world law, therefore, one must include within it not only world
customary law, in the sense indicated above, but also international law in Bentham's sense and
transnational law in Jessup's sense." Id.
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Ultimately, the viability and/or constitutionality of supranational adjudica-
tion is not overly important, because it is doubtful that individuals in a globalized
world can rely on such methods of dispute resolution. The construction of these
institutions is fundamentally the same as the existing model of national courts. But
we are under no obligation to conform to the Westphalian-style adjudication pro-
cess. The more exciting possibility is of diffuse, amorphous interpersonal re-
sponses. Some elements of a denationalized global legal culture may be gathered
from historical systems. Three brief and disparate models are provided below.
The reader is cautioned that these are extremely simplified explanations of three
rich legal histories; they are only meant to show those educated in the U.S. legal
education system that many models of "law" exist. They offer alternative theories
to consider how the theory of a global legal culture can include both existing legal
frameworks and further development of new structures and thought.
A. The Chinese Duality of Li and Fa
Ancient Chinese legal philosophers were divided into two main schools: Le-
galism and Confucianism. The Legalists advocated governance by means of a
strict Rule of Law imposed by a strong central state. Confucian philosophers ar-
gued that legal coercion was of limited efficacy and stressed that sustainable gov-
ernment was a matter of implementing education, persuasion, and moral
example. The dichotomy is often characterized as the difference betweenfa (for-
mal law) and li (moral and social conduct).' Il
Confucianism can be considered both idealistic and utilitarian-if a society
were truly to adhere to li, disputes could be resolved through friendly negotia-
tion and compromise, "a system of explicit legal rules rendered unnecessary......
Confucian scholars criticized the strict Legalist system for forcing people "to
think only in terms of their self-interest and make them litigious, trying to ma-
nipulate the laws to suit their own interests.""' 3
11l. For a consideration of Confucianism as it related to modern China and modern political
theory, see R.P. Peerenboom, What's Wrong With Chinese Rights? Towards a Theory of Rights with
Chinese Characteristics, 6 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 29, 39-47 (1993). For a general survey of the pre-
Communist legal history of China, see ALBERT H.Y. CHEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYS-
TEM OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 6-23 (I992) and LASZLO LADANY, LAW AND LEGALITY IN
CHINA: THE TESTAMENT OF A CHINA-WATCHER 33-51 (Marie-Luise N5th ed., 1992).
112. CHEN,supra note 111, at 9.
113. Id.
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A second main concept in Confucianism is ren, the duty to act appropriately
in relation to others." 4 Ren is a combination of deference to others and the need to
earn respect from others. Under Confucianism, society can be seen as an extended
family. Respect for authority is a pillar, with a strong correlation between respect
for parents and the government. Particularly under Mencius's elaboration of Con-
fucian theory, authority figures also have parallel responsibilities to the people." 5
Mencius would insist that modern figures of power, such as corporations with
great economic influence, also accept their responsibility to the people.
Confucianism became the dominant state philosophy during the Han
dynasty and remained so until the twentieth century. It was interpreted and ma-
nipulated, however, by the emperors in each dynasty, and the ideal of Confu-
cianism was never seriously pursued. A form of legalism prevailed, as obedience
to government commands was demanded of the Chinese citizens. Though the
Chinese government never achieved the Confucian ideals, the society itself is
still deeply influenced by the concepts ofli and ren. Individuals have many more
social expectations than in Western societies; moreover they assume much more
informal but obligatory regulation of human relationships. 116
The most significant point for this Note in the vestiges of classical Confucian-
ism is the retention of expectations that certain social rituals and norms exist, with
a corresponding expectation that these rituals and norms may change and lack
clarity. These are not only social norms, but present in legal philosophy itself. Glo-
bal legal culture may provide the same structure of expectation, at the global, re-
gional and local level, without specifying what these responsibilities and rights
may be. They may be indigenized by each level of community as needed. Retain-
ing rigid legal structures and adopting the concept of a modern, global 1i are not
mutually exclusive. The ideal of a Confucian society still includes formalized,
written law, but it is used only as a last resort when "virtue" has failed.1"7 "Only
114. Peerenboom, supra note 11l, at 44. Some Americans find Confucianism hard to compre-
hend because there is no equivalent sense of overarching duty. "In the United States, much is
made of rights, but duties, if discussed at all, are considered merely as corollaries to rights. ...
Chinese tradition turns Hohfeld on his head: rights are corollaries to duties." Id. at 43.
115. Id. at 10.
116. Confucianism as a political philosophy spread across all of East Asia, and its basic premises
are still evident today.
117. Corporate Codes of Conduct are the type of self-regulating law some see as vital to healthy
globalization, and that is the type of1i one may foresee. For a discussion of Corporate Codes of
Conduct, see supra note 13.
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when a person is an extreme recalcitrant or when the education system has broken
down would it be necessary to use the severe sanctions of law.""...
B. Native American Tribal Peacemaking
Another historical example of the possibility of borderless law was found on
the North American continent before European colonization. Native American
tribes used law as simply another element of their "collective and communal cul-
ture," alongside language, religion, and worldview."9 Most Native American
tribes were not bound by static statist boundaries of division, partly because
some tribes were wholly or partly-nomadic. Because of an emphasis on the need
to reintegrate offenders into society and not alienate injured parties (as well as a
lack of jails), tribes attempted to use communication and accountability to re-
solve disputes. 2 ' Thus formal courts were kept to a minimum, and elders would
attempt to guide a favorable result by using what we now call alternative dispute
resolution (ADR).
In its annual report, the Judicial Branch of the Navajo Nation has recounted
that "the basic theme of Navajo thought, is harmony, to live in harmony ... the
intent of the Navajo dispute resolution system was to preserve the peace and to
avoid disruption and fighting."'' It usually included compensation for the vic-
tim and an attempt to reconcile the guilty party with the community, and the
procedure included allowing any party with interest in or knowledge of the case
118. VICTOR H. Li, LAW WITHOUT LAWYERS: A COMPARATIVE VIEW OF LAW IN CHINA AND THE
UNITED STATES 13 (1978). Li points out a further benefit of the Chinese tradition, that law ought to
be simple in order to serve the masses. "The underlying principle is that law should be, and indeed
must be, broadly based rather than the special province of a group of elite professionals." Id. at 10.
One hope of a global legal culture is that it may be organic and logical, thus easily understood by
individuals. This philosophy also means that meditation has been heavily relied upon in China.
See Cao Pei, The Origins of Mediation in Traditional China, 54 Disp. RES. J. 32 (1999). There were
three steps of mediation in civil procedure at the local level: compelled "private settlement," hav-
ing a village head conduct mediation, and a more official mediation process, where government
officials themselves would mediate. Id. at 33.
119. William C. Bradford, Reclaiming Indigenous LegalAutonomy on the Path to Peaceful Coexist-
ence: The Theory, Practice, and Limitations of Tribal Peacemaking in Indian Dispute Resolution, 76
N.D. L. REV. 551, 564-65 (2000).
120. Id. at 565.
121. JUDICIAL BRANCH OF THE NAVAJo NATION, ANNUAL REPORT: THE NAvAJo CONCEPT OF JUSTICE
2 (1988), reprinted in DAVID H. GETCHES ET AL. EDS., CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAW
396-97 (4th ed. 1998).
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to be heard. "This system developed over hundreds of years and exists today in
the form of our Peacemaker Courts. The outsiders know it as mediation."'
' 22
This system was slowly suffocated by the dominant American political sys-
tem. A significant breaking point was the Major Crimes Act of 1885, limiting
tribal sovereignty by requiring federal prosecution of Indians that committed
certain felonies. 123 Despite a long period of almost total loss of legal sovereignty,
Indian tribes have recently begun to reassert traditional means of dispute resolu-
tion through modern ADR methods, also referred to as Tribal Peacemaking
(TPM), although the tribal court systems still operate primarily alongside the
formalized U.S. structure.
124
C. Thai Law and Postmodernism
Thai law could serve as a model for a multi-dimensional global legal cul-
ture. Thai law is roughly divided into two sources: a positive legal order and a
social order drawn from religion, culture and tradition. 125 Thai law maintains
elements of Buddhist law, but also includes purely Thai traditions and elements
of international commercial norms of Southeast and East Asia. 126 Static and vir-
tually unchanged for centuries, Buddhist law is a loose collection of principles,
but is considered law rather than simply a moral code because it involves direct
repercussions for violations, especially for violations by the religious order.
127
Thailand never fully accepted the Westphalian assumption that law is a
purely positivist, communitarian construct. As modern Thai law developed, cer-
tain substantive law, including family and property law, remained based on Bud-
dhist law.12 But other areas of law, such as criminal procedure and administrative
122. Id.
123. Bradford,supra note 119, at 570-71.
124. Id. at 577-89. For example, in May 1994 the Tlingit tribe "secured a form of plea bargain
unique in American history." Id. at 590-91; see also Experiment in Tribal Justice: 2 Youths Are Ban-
ished, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 1994, at A6. Although that particular situation revealed many problems
with TPM, it provided a creative attempt to resolve a dispute outside of the regular legal system.
125. APIRAT PETCHSIRI, EASTERN IMPORTATION OF WESTERN CRIMINAL LAW: THAILAND AS A CASE
STUDY 150 (1987).
126. DAVID M. ENGEL, CODE AND CUSTOM IN A THAI PROVINCIAL COURT: THE INTERACTION OF FOR-
MAL AND INFORMAL SYSTEMS OF JUSTICE 74 (Frank Reynolds ed., 1978); see also PETCHSIRI, supra
note 125, at 149-66 (discussing the diverse sources of formal Thai law).
127. Se Sompong Sucharitkul, Thai Law and Buddhist Law, 46 AM. J. COMp. L. 69, 69-72, 78
(Supp. 1998).
128. Id. at 85.
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law, developed independently. The twentieth century constitutional government
has attempted to maintain indigenous law without sacrificing the benefits of more
formalist models. Modern Thai law is one of the best examples of legal pluralism,
a mixture of traditional and Western, formal and informal, legal controls and so-
cial norms. Globalization of law must recognize that legal pluralism is necessary
to allow for diverse procedures and substantive laws while still recognizing gen-
eral theories and frameworks.
Although Buddhism developed a strict set of laws, it has always contained
an implicit element of valuing virtuous autonomy. Andrew Huxley explains it as
"[w]eak antinomianism," in which "the impulsive behavior of the truly virtuous
is better than a calculating obedience to rules."'29 The consequence of this belief
is to recognize that binding laws are only necessary in certain situations, creating
a situationalist "virtue" subtext to the formal legal code. Ultimately, the justice of
the situation is what controls the resolution of a dispute. "Rules merely give a
first approximation to the truth."'3 °
"Once law is viewed as an emanation of the nation state.., it cannot claim
to be any more than local knowledge," Huxley explained."' International orga-
nization and law-making stand in contrast to this limited idea of law as "local",
but this does not mean that the U.N. Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
for example, is necessarily a regression back to natural law. "Since the early nine-
teenth century, law, unlike other disciplines, has had to accept less ambitious
truth claims for itself."'3 The UNDHR is an ideal, but few claim it to be of the
stature of natural law. If the postmodernist claim that different legal traditions
and cultures are incommensurable is correct, then "we can only compare differ-
ent traditions by comparing degrees of incomparability."' 33 Striving for a homo-
geneous global legal structure is then an exercise in futility. More realizable is the
idea of the global legal culture assuming rights and responsibilities without de-
129. Andrew Huxley, Golden Yoke, Silken Text, 106 YALE L.J. 1885, 1910 (1997) (reviewing
REBECCA REDWOOD FRENCH, THE GOLDEN YOKE: THE LEGAL COSMOLOGY OF BUDDHIST TIBET (1995)
and R.E PEERENBOOM, LAW AND MORALITY IN ANCIENT CHINA: THE SILK MANUSCRIPTS OF HUANG-
LAO (I993)).
130. See id. The implications of this philosophy, especially on such legal theories as causation and
mens rea, are complex and not predictable.
131. Id. at 1927.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 1928.
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fining them in absolute terms, instead allowing informal, indigenous mixtures
of traditions, cultures, and some (mostly procedural) global legal standards.
Natural law contains some concepts that are useful in examining the Bud-
dhist aspects of Thai law. "Early natural law's general preference for situational
ethics over explicit rules must surely connect with its preference for theories of
causation that emphasize complexity and multiplicity."'34 Buddhist theory, by
stressing multiple causes to any act, denies the artifice of rules.'35 The general
need we can observe is to shift the legal focus from implementation of rules to
observation of situations.
The Thai model of justice should not suggest that it is a society in which the
individual is subsumed to strong communitarian and religious identity. On the
contrary, individualism is a much more prominent element in Thailand than in
many other Asian societies."' As in the cosmopolitan and diaspora models of dif-
fuse identity, this retention of a thread of individual autonomy results in social
identities that are both flexible and transitory.'37 Traditional groupings, such as
kinship, are still an important part of many individuals' identities, but this is a
choice by the individual to recognize kinship as part of his or her identity, not an
imposed identity. "Individuals of all ages recurringly move in and out of families;
families splinter, in full or in part.... What is perhaps most distinctive of this flux
is the sense of uncertainty that surrounds it-a state that is easily tolerated by the
villagers."'q3 This allows for a broad concept of community and identity.1
39
As a result of this social structure, a hierarchy of dispute resolution methods
exists; which method is applied depends on the nature of the dispute and the
party's positions in the social hierarchy. 4 The existence of multiple levels of
134. Id. at 1945.
135. Huxley explains: "The Buddhist theory... offers a knock-down argument to the concept of
rule: A rule is a schema that deals with situations by unscientifically distinguishing causal
efficacy... To justify evading an inconvenient rule, the European tradition has to resort to de-
vices like the maxims of equality or Dworkinian principles: these are needed, Buddhists would
say, to patch over the holes in a leaky theory of causation." Id.
136. ENGEL, SUpra note 126, at 69.
137. Id.
138. HERBERT P PHILLIPS, THAI PEASANT PERSONALITY: THE PATTERNING OF INTERPERSONAL BE-
HAVIOR IN THE VILLAGE OF BANG CHAN 29 (1965),quotedin ENGEL,SUpra note 126, at 70.
139. See ENGEL, SUpra note 126, at 70-73.
140. See generally id. at 80-98 (describing the various levels of dispute resolution in Thailand, in-
cluding non-official mediation, mediation by village chief and kamnan, district level mediation,
police mediation, and mediation by private attorneys).
CHANGING IDENTITIES AND CHANGING LAW
dispute resolution has resulted in a general desire to avoid litigation at all costs,
and few private disputes reach the provincial courts. "Thailand was and remains
a non-litigious society. Among most Thais there is still a strong preference for
mediation rather than direct confrontation and the adjudication of private dis-
putes. Courts of law are generally avoided, and a low value is placed upon the re-
sort to litigation."41
III. BARRIERS TO DENATIONALIZED IDENTITY AND GLOBAL LEGAL CULTURE
A. The Limits of Denationalization
Do these theories matter? The themes of this Note would be almost incom-
prehensible to the vast majority of citizens in any country from America to Zim-
babwe. Nationality is still considered a defining part of identity. The ninety
percent of Americans who do not have a passport are loath to lose any sense of
identity, especially in the period after 9/11 when many perceive their national
identity as being under attack. The United States is as diverse a society as exists
in the world, yet nationalism and patriotism here are major elements of identity,
and omnipresent in politics and the media.
In the European Union, the most integrated transnational region in the
world, only 5.5 million of the 370 million inhabitants lived outside of their own
member state in 1998.142 EU citizens do travel frequently, but permanent settle-
ment is not common. EU residents of other countries have very low registration
rates to vote in the host countries' EU or local elections. In theory the ability of
EU residents to vote in both local and EU elections in any EU country, tradition-
ally a fundamental element of "citizenship," is one of the most revolutionary,
forward-looking aspects of the European Union. But in practice people either
stay linked to their home country or do not vote at all. 43 In addition, general
141. Id. at 3. Engel recounts that Thai citizens sum up this desire by saying, "It is better to eat dog
shit than go to court." Id. at 98.
142. Marco Martiniello, Citizenship in the European Union, in FROM MIGRANTS TO CITIZENS, supra
note 17, at 368.
143. Id. at 369-70. Jean-Marie Gu~henno has speculated that democracy as recognized today
may not be viable in the future. "We must ask today whether there can be a democracy without a
nation... The nostalgic citizens of the declining Roman republic appealed, not without gran-
deur, to the virtue of ancient times. Our lamentations today will not stop the march toward a new
empire, any more than did theirs." GUbiENNO,supra note 66, at xi-xii.
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turnouts for Euro-elections have been low. "One of the clearest indicators of cit-
izenship is the casting of one's vote, and the turnout in an election is often reck-
oned an index of the strength of a nation's sense of citizenship."' 44 The European
Union's limited success in shifting attention from national elections shows how
deeply imbedded national identity is.
Also, many postmodern citizenship studies ignore countries, such as Japan,
that are tightly ethnically bound and extremely resistant to granting citizenship.'45
Very little consideration is given to the dynamics of citizenship in such countries.
Ethnically-bound nation-states and the limited mobility, education, and enrich-
ment of most of the world's population create strong barriers to the possibility of
a denationalized world. As a form of self-defense against hunger and/or enemies,
the nation-state is still perceived as protecting citizens. It is difficult to extricate the
sense of national identity when one is still relying on the nation-state for fulfill-
ment of the basic human needs of health care, shelter, and employment. Franck
points out that although individuals are gaining more freedom of choice of iden-
tity, "[this freedom] does not yet engage the majority of the world's people. It may
never do so, leaving a world half-determinist and half-autonomous.' 46 The po-
tential for the autonomy of identity is restricted in much of the world by low levels
of development and mobility, both social and physical.
Thus these visions are distant ones, and they presuppose a progressive de-
velopmental future for underdeveloped areas with rich cultural, ethnic, and lin-
guistic mixtures and tenuous political boundaries, especially in South Asia and
sub-Saharan Africa. Is a world "in which the dynamism of growing autonomy
engulfs the lingering static forces of racial, cultural, national, linguistic and reli-
gious determinism" any more likely than a continuing unequal, divided, and
violent world? 47 To dissolve these "lingering static forces," we are dependent
upon the development of alternative forms of identity as a means of neutralizing
national exclusivism.
144. DEREK HEATER, WHAT IS CITIZENSHIP? 130 (1999).
145. Even Japan is reconsidering its concept of the link between national identity and citizen-
ship. In Tokyo, one in ten Japanese marriages involves a foreigner. Howard French, For More
Japanese, Love is a Multiethnic Thing, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 2002, at A3. Japan now relies quite
heavily on foreign laborers from Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines to serve as unskilled la-
bor. Though the naturalization process is stringent enough that the citizenry remains almost en-
tirely ethnically Japanese, the actual population is much more diverse.
146. Franck, supra note 30, at 64.
147. Id.
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There are dangers in the breakdown of static citizenship and identity. The
footnote above on transnational corporations and their increasing transience and
lack of location foreshadows the possible future for individuals.'48 Jean-Marie
Gu~henno sees evidence of this in the fact that short-term interests now increas-
ingly control social decision-making: "This is the ultimate logic of a world that
is no longer defined by the human groupings (national or corporate) that it is
composed of, but only by the problems with which it must deal.... [T]he stress
[is] on the transaction rather than on the relationship with the client....""' The em-
phasis is being transferred from the relationship to the transaction because one
cannot reliably expect to encounter the same entity in the future. Indeed, one can
choose to avoid the partner of a past transaction and look to another entity any-
where on the globe.
B. A Viable Global Identity
The importance of identification with mankind is vital to the hope of devel-
oping a global legal culture. "The introduction of the concept of the common
heritage points to the possibility of a legal order based on equity and coopera-
tion."'5 ° One barrier to the dissolution of traditional forms of communal identi-
fication presented by many commentators is that people are not capable of
identifying with humanity at large, "because the category is too big and too ab-
stract to serve as the object of political love and identification.''. This logic pro-
ceeds as follows: a small, cohesive, homogeneous social unit is obviously easy to
identify with. People identify first with the family unit, then with a small group
of friends, co-workers, or residents. Small-town folk are famously friendly in
part because they can more easily identify themselves (and be identified) as hav-
ing common goals and ideologies. But each further enlargement of the sphere of
community requires an increased abstraction of identity and a reduced marginal
return of the created unity. Commentators extend this logic and assume that an
individual can identify with a nation of three million or 100 million citizens, but
that the global society of six billion humans is too diverse and vast to have any
sense of common identity.
148. See supra text accompanying note 13.
149. GU9HENNO,supra note 66, at 26 (emphasis added).
150. David Held, International Law, in THE GLOBAL TRANSFORMATIONS READER, supra note 65, at
167, 170.
151. Bosniak,supra note 5, at 496.
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Upon closer look this logic is flawed. Identifying with the artificial nation-
state of three or 100 million is a project of identifying common desires and needs
that are different from those of citizens of other nation-states. American patrio-
tism strains the idea of common identity, with individuals of every possible
political, cultural, and ideological shade drawn together and wrapped in the
same red, white and blue flag. The project of nationalism involves identifying
ways in which certain groups of individuals are different. More accurate than
the above misconception is the belief that "if cosmopolitanism were really too
big, then the nation would be too big as well."'52
It may be easier to identify with six billion humans than with a diverse
nation, because it is a matter of identifying how we are all the same (the classic
cosmopolitan project). Martha Nussbaum has portrayed the concept of shared
human desires and needs as the need of all humans to fulfill basic "capabili-
ties." '153 She provides a broad list of cross-cultural empirical human needs, rang-
ing from physical to emotional to social needs.'54 The primary contemporary
examples are shared concerns about environmental destruction, nuclear fall-out,
food shortages, global warming. Obviously more specific self-identification oc-
curs on a smaller scale, but it is much easier to identify the harmony of human-
ity's physical, social and emotional needs than to identify the specific, shared
desires and needs of any one nation-state. Self-identification by emphasizing
difference within a community is logical, but imposing this identification along
citizenship lines is arbitrary. It should be as easy to envision the common identity
of "humanity" than it is "America" or "Brazil."'55 This does not obstruct our
ability to create narrower definitions of identity, but merely directs us towards
definitions that don't depend on nation-states.
152. COSMOPOLITICS: THINKING AND FEELING BEYOND THE NATION 6 (Pheng Cheah & Bruce Rob-
bins eds., 1998).
153. See Martha C. Nussbaum, Capabilities and Human Rights, 66 FORD. L. REV. 273 (1997).
154. The full list includes life; bodily health; bodily integrity; senses, imagination, and thought;
emotions; practical reason; affiliation; friendship; respect; other species; play; and control over
one's environment. Id. at 287-88.
155. Perhaps this is the real reason why people responded so well around the world after 9/11 to
comments that "we are all Americans." It appeals to the sentiment that, beyond the political
movements mentioned above, we all share basic human emotions of love and fear, desire and re-
gret. In a similar vein, we all sometimes feel sympathy for those below us and envy for those above
us. We are all curious about the universe.
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John Rawls declared that we possess two types of duties: those naturally held
as human beings and those voluntarily accepted as members of a community. 6
The natural duties are minimal and abstract, including to avoid gratuitous cruelty
and to do justice. But the majority of obligations are accepted, explicitly or implic-
itly, as part of a group. Especially over the past century, these accepted obligations
have come to be defined by the nation-state, but there is no reason to expect that
this will always be so. The deconstruction of this induced sense of communal iden-
tity leaves us with two options: to regroup in other social units, or to emphasize
those rights and duties that Rawls defined. Doing both of these--emphasizing
global customary norms and envisioning ourselves as members of many different
communities, depending upon our actions and locations to determine what legal
structure applies-provides a basis for a global legal culture.
In global civil society, writes Thomas Franck, we will find increasing "inter-
active transnational factions, passionate value-and-policy discourses and emerg-
ing public and private transactional networks."'57 These growing transactional
networks and discourses will be the working grounds of the legal profession in
the evolving global legal culture; this will require professional changes, even if
legal culture and structures are never completely denationalized.
IV. POSSIBLE INSTITUTIONAL CHANGES IN RESPONSE TO A
GLOBAL LEGAL CULTURE
What are the possible institutional changes that may come about in response
to a global legal culture? While that could only be fully addressed in a separate
Note, a rough sketch of ideas helps to make the idea more concrete. As emphasis
shifts from sovereign national law to a global legal culture, established court sys-
tems will be relied upon less. A theory of a global legal culture does not necessarily
require entirely new institutions, but may instead encourage a shift to existing al-
ternative structures."' One possible positive result of globalization would be a
156. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 108-17 (1971).
157. Franck,supra note 30, at 64.
158. See generally Roger S. Haydock, Civil Justice and Dispute Resolution in the Twenty-First Cen-
tury: Mediation and Arbitration Now and for the Future, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 745 (2000) (ad-
vocating ADR as providing fair, efficient resolution of interpersonal and business disputes). The
Thai law reviewed above as a model for a global legal culture has led to minimal reliance on liti-
gation. See supra text accompanying notes 125-41.
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shift away from litigation and towards more narrowly designed, more efficient,
less adversarial dispute resolution methods.'59 True globalization will require a
paradigm shift in the legal profession, and there are already signs of a lessening in-
fluence of and reliance upon national courts. "[F]ormal dispute settlement mech-
anisms based on legal principles are increasingly being used as methods of
resolving international disputes."'' ° Law firms that find creative ways to antici-
pate these changes will prosper. 16' Encouraging new forms of dispute resolution
advances the development and adoption of some aspects of a global legal culture.
State-centered law is not effective in providing resolution for business enti-
ties that are attempting to minimize encounters with borders entirely. 162 These
global entities are also searching for methods of dispute resolution that can op-
erate at the same pace as global communications and trade networks, something
that national courts are unable to do. 61 International business is leading the
159. 150 years ago Abraham Lincoln advised his fellow lawyers: "Discourage litigation. Per-
suade your neighbors to compromise whenever you can. Point out to them how the nominal win-
ner is often a real loser-in fees, expenses and waste of time." Abraham Lincoln, Notesfor a Law
Lecture (July 1, 1850), in THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 81 (Roy P Basler & Chris-
tian 0. Basler eds., 1990). Lincoln reassured lawyers concerned that use of ADR would make
them redundant that "[t]here will still be business enough." Id.
160. Daniel S. Sullivan, Effective International Dispute Settlement Mechanisms and the Necessary
Condition of Liberal Democracy, 81 GEO. L.J. 2369 (1993). However, the implementation of interna-
tional mechanisms does not necessarily mean that national identity and favoritism is absent in
these forums. See Al J. Daniel, Jr., Agricultural Reform: The European Community, the Uruguay
Round, and International Dispute Resolution, 46 ARK. L. REV. 873, 918 (1994) ("A comparison of the
dispute resolution mechanisms in the EC and in the GATT shows continuing examples of na-
tional favoritism and discrimination ... ").
161. For example, law firms that focus on providing consistent and focused mediation and arbi-
tration services, and enhance their ability to bridge cultural and linguistic divides, will be able to
avoid the courts altogether in resolving the majority of their clients' disputes. Clients should be
able to rely on case-specific services: procedure can be based on standard ADR models, but it can
also be specially crafted to each case. Of course, as a consequence of providing more flexible, effi-
cient systems, international law firms may see a reduction in the fees they reap from the complex-
ity of traditional international litigation, which may be a major impetus to resist change. It takes
tremendous effort to induce change in the legal profession: the necessary changes may come only
from lawyers devoted to non-traditional globalized dispute resolution processes operating parallel
to existing institutions.
162. See Alfred C. Aman, Jr., The Globalizing State: A Future-Oriented Perspective on the Public!
Private Distinction, Federalism, and Democracy, 31 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 769, 783 (1998).
163. See id. at 784. Civil procedure throughout the world is entangled in complicated disputes
over standing and jurisdiction; domestic courts must spend a disproportionate amount of time
dealing with transnational cases because of their inherent complexities.
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transformation, with most disputes removed from national courts and resolved
either by negotiation or before formal but non-national dispute resolution
bodies. Institutions such as the Center for International Commercial Arbitra-
tion, the International Chamber of Commerce, and the London Court of Inter-
national Arbitration all provide structures for international arbitration.
Attempts to create processes more appropriate for a denationalized world have
been applied in almost every specific trade industry." 4 These bodies' procedures
and regulations are arguably more important to the international business com-
munity than that of any one nation.'65 Arbitration, especially, "has been a growth
industry in the last twenty to thirty years. ' The use of arbitration, regional and
specialized courts, and transnational use of domestic courts "amount to a revo-
lution in international law."' 67 Further changes will affect not just international
law, but all levels of legal process.'68
164. See, e.g., Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the
Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992), summarized in Volkmar Gessner, Globalization
and Legal Certainty, in THE GLOBAL TRANSFORMATIONS READER, supra note 65, at 172, 176. Because
almost all dealers belonging to twenty worldwide trading clubs, an independent dispute resolu-
tion process has been set up. "The system remains completely apart from state penal code, contract
law and bankruptcy law, and state courts are replaced by arbitration or on occasion by proceedings
in Jewish rabbinical courts." Id. Gessner uses the banking industry as another example of a highly-
efficient, closed resolution process. It relies almost purely on informal resolution, with little arbi-
tration and virtually no litigation. He presents the reinsurance industry as a counterexample,
where until recently many contracts were informal and based on trust, and disputes were resolved
by arbitration. After a series of catastrophes, documentation was formalized and litigation in-
creased. See id. at 176-77.
165. Besides dispute resolution, international institutions also play a significant role in setting
standards and models for legal documents and procedures. The Convention on the International
Sale of Goods (CISG) is highly respected and used in international business transactions. For a
history of the CISG, see Anthony S. Winer, The CISG Convention and Thomas Franck's Theory of
Legitimacy, 19 Nw. J. INTL L. & Bus. 1, 7-10 (1998).
166. BARRY E. CARTER & PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 22 (3rd ed. 1999). See generally
The Growing Use of ADR in International Disputes, 54 Disp. RES. J. 8-47 (1999) (a collection of six
articles about the implementation of international ADR).
167. CARTER, supra note 166, at 22.
168. Used not only transnationally, private ADR has also grown exponentially in the United
States. "At the midpoint of the twentieth century ADR was used primarily in specialized settings,
such as labor, but its use now extends to almost every sector of society." STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG ET
AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION: NEGOTIATION, MEDIATION, AND OTHER PROcEssEs 421 (2nd ed. 1992); see
also Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984) (announcing a policy of encouraging arbitra-
tion); Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1,25 (1983) (reading the
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As in many fields, the high-tech industry and cyberindustry are leaders in cre-
ating non-national legal institutions. "A defining characteristic of digital technol-
ogies is their ability to transcend territorial boundaries, thereby challenging the
unfettered jurisdiction of any single nation-state and complicating the application
and enforcement of existing legal rules." '169 An example of this transnational be-
havior is the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP) 70 In es-
sence, the Internet community has formed its own worldwide community and
designed a custom-made dispute resolution policy, forming a closed legal process.
These processes will become more common in a global legal culture.
Can these examples be replicated in other fields? The supervisory body of
the UDRP has control of the regulation of domain-names: perhaps this concen-
tration of power is necessary for such a body to succeed. 7' But UDRP has also
been voluntarily adopted by New.net, a firm that registers second-level domain
names.'72 "[W]here a non-national dispute settlement system has advantages
over traditional adjudication or arbitration, these advantages may in themselves
persuade other public or private regulatory bodies to adopt the system."'73 Per-
haps in the future, private for-profit or non-profit organizations will operate as
adjudicative competitors to national courts, inducing the market into more effi-
cient and user-friendly dispute settlement options.
Federal Arbitration Act as reading that "any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues
should be resolved in favor of arbitration"); Harold H, Bruff, Public Programs, Private Deciders:
The Constitutionality ofArbitration in Federal Programs, 67 TEx. L. REv. 441,445-49 (1989) (discuss-
ing the initial resistance to and subsequent acceptance of administrative arbitration). But see Mar-
garet M. Harding, The Clash Between Federal and State Arbitration Law and the Appropriateness of
Arbitration asa Dispute Resolution Process, 77 NEB. L. REv. 397, 398 (1998) ("The prevalence of ar-
bitration clauses in contracts of adhesion has caused a backlash against arbitration.").
169. Laurence R. Helfer & Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Designing Non-National Systems: The Case of
the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, 43 WM. & MARY L. REv. 141, 144 (2001).
170. UDRP is promulgated by the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers
(ICANN), a supervisory body for the Internet, to resolve disputes over domain names, including
cybersquatting. See generally id. If its services are requested, a dispute resolution provider is se-
lected under the UDRP and a three-person panel is appointed without input by the parties. Cases
must be decided within 45 days of being filed, and detailed procedural rules are drafted along the
lines of a model procedural code. Id. at 176-77. ICANN selected the World Intellectual Property
Organization as the first dispute resolution provider, followed by the National Arbitration Forum
and eResolution. Id. at 187.
171. Id. at 238.
172. Id. at 239-40.
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We are approaching a crucial turning point in the balance between stable
national sovereignty and interconnected but dispersed communities. Andrew
Linklater has speculated that "[iun the age of globalisation and fragmentation, a
new stage in the development of citizenship rights is promised by efforts to
strike the balance between concrete attachments to local or national communi-
ties and more abstract cosmopolitan affiliations."'74 Michael Sandel used a simi-
lar theoretical base to argue that "Is]elf-government today, however, requires a
politics that plays itself out in a multiplicity of settings, from neighborhoods to
nations to the world as a whole. Such a politics requires citizens who can abide
the ambiguity associated with divided sovereignty." '75 National governments
will not undertake the necessary changes to allow open-ended and even ambig-
uous citizenship. Indeed, nation-states may resist them. The legal profession has
changed very little in the past 200 years, but lawyers are precisely those who
should be able to lead revolutions by imagining and buildings new structures of
social and legal organization. Perhaps a bar association is correct when it writes:
If the law were just another company, or just another industry
about to become obsolete, it would matter little in the overall
order of things what, if anything, we do. But the law is not just an-
other business or industry. It is the foundation upon which our
entire society and our system of justice and enlightened self-
government are founded.... Our greatest peril is that if we
cannot survive as an "industry" and as a profession, then the
underlying core principles and the Rule of Law are themselves at
risk 176
Anticipating and adapting to a denationalized future is the most important
step in the project of protecting "the underlying core principles and the Rule of
Law." Even if the theory of a global legal culture is not fully developed, thinking
in such ways allows the profession to prepare for future denationalization,
thereby designing new legal theories and structures of dispute resolution.
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